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INTRODUCTION
Over the past few years, social media has become a useful way to dis-
seminate information to a large group of people with little cost in terms of
time and money.' Services such as Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, Flickr, and
WordPress are no longer used exclusively by individuals for social network-
ing or entertainment purposes. Groups and organizations-both public and
private-are increasingly using social media sites as a way to inform inter-
ested individuals of ongoing developments, while allowing the public at
large to instantly provide their own feedback. 2 In an emergency event or a
public health crisis, the ability of organizations such as the Centers for Dis-
ease Control and Prevention (CDC) or the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA)3 to rapidly disseminate useful information may mitigate
the severity of a disaster, prevent damage to property, and save lives.' Social
media, when properly used by these organizations, has tremendous potential
to shape the way our nation handles emergencies and public health crises.5
Individuals, the traditional users of social media networks, have also
enhanced the development of emergency networks and assisted with public
1. See Jared Kaltwasser, Social Media an Effective Strategy for Tight Marketing Budg-
ets, NJBIZ, May 23, 2011, at 20; Kristina Lerman & Rumi Ghosh, Information Contagion: An
Empirical Study of the Spread of News on Digg and Twitter Social Networks, in PROCEEDINGS
OF THE 4TH INTERNATIONAL AAAI CONFERENCE ON WEBLOGS AND SOCIAL MEDIA (2010),
available at http:/www.aaai.org/ocs/index.php/ICWSMICWSM I 0/paper/viewPDFinterstitiall
1509/1839; see also Sue Ann Kern, Why Solid Social Media Strategy
Is a Cost-Effective Marketing Tool, FACEITSOCIALMEDIA (Aug. 02, 2010), http://
www.faceitsocialmedia.com/2010/08/why-social-media-is-a-cost-effective-marketing-tool/.
2. E.g., Christine A. Lukes, Social Media, 58 AAOHN J. 415 (2010).
3. See J. Nicholas Hoover, FEMA to Use Social Media for Emergency Response,
INFORMATIONWEEK (Jan. 19, 2011, 4:00 PM), http://www.informationweek.com/news/
government/info-management/22900091 8.
4. See Raina M. Merchant et al., Integrating Social Media Into Emergency-
Preparedness Efforts, 365 NEw ENG. J. MED. 289-91 (July 28, 2011), available at
www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMpI 103591 (discussing recent usages of social media
during emergencies and emergency-preparedness efforts and the potential for improved emer-
gency services before, during, and after an emergency or crisis).
5. Id.
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health crises through social media networks.6 These social media networks
have proven to be useful forums for individual users to provide instantane-
ous feedback on the latest news at the site of the incident.' Additionally and
perhaps more importantly, these social media networks serve as a resource
for those seeking help or advice on how to handle the emergency or crisis.8
In a sense, social media has become the ideal manifestation of the "Market-
place of Ideas" (hereinafter "Marketplace") that Chief Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes articulated.9 The Marketplace concept will be discussed in
greater detail below, but in brief, it is the theory that truth will surface over
falsehoods when all opinions and ideas are freely expressed, because the
value or worth of that opinion or idea will be determined on the market of
public opinion.'o
Part I of this Note will examine the Marketplace concept through the
works of various legal and philosophical theorists. Chief among them is
Frederick Schauer's work Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry, in which
he discusses the Marketplace theory and the concept's reliance on freedom
of speech in order to pursue the truth and increase knowledge." Schauer
points out two major assumptions that are critical to the Marketplace theory:
1) that reason prevails amongst all members of society and 2) that open de-
bate and discussion are always beneficial because society will eventually be
guided towards the truth.12 Schauer argues that neither of these assumptions
are necessarily true, and in the instance of an emergency, the Marketplace
theory breaks down entirely." However, Schauer and other Marketplace
6. Id. at 290 (discussing the general public's role as part of a "large response network,
rather than remaining mere bystanders").
7. Id.
8. See, e.g., Leysia Palen, Online Social Media in Crisis Events, 3 EDUCAUSE Q. 76
(2008), available at http://net.educause.edu/ir/library/pdf/EQM08313.pdf (noting the ability
of "disaster survivors, curious observers, and those who wish to help victims[-]to connect to
one another and to participate in events, including through seeking and providing information
peer-to-peer").
9. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630-31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
("[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of
the market and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.
That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution."); see also Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[T]he only meaning of free speech is that they
should be given their chance and have their way.").
10. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 16 (1982).
I1. Id. at 15-34 (exploring the justification for freedom of speech and expression in
what Schauer calls the "argument from truth"; he consequently explores the Marketplace
theory in great depth because of the theory's prominence in the First Amendment's free speech
doctrine).
12. Id. at 26-30 (noting that the Marketplace is "plagued by two major flaws ... [it]
rests on an assumption about the prevalence of reason . . . [and] there is no reason to assume
that open debate and discussion will automatically and in every case be beneficial").
13. Id. at 30 ("When, because of emergency, passion, or anger, there is no opportunity
to reflect on the wisdom of an expressed opinion, and there is no opportunity for counter-
argument, there is no reason to rely on the argument from truth.").
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theorists' analyses do not end our inquiry into the disconnects between the
Marketplace model and the utilization of social media during emergencies
and public health crises. This Note next explores the use of limited regulato-
ry structures in an adaptive Marketplace in the new environment of digital
speech.14 This Note will examine the argument that freedom of speech in the
digital age should have some form of regulatory structure in place, based on
principles normally associated with collective self-government, to manage
discourse and structure public debate.' 5 Additionally, this Note will explore
Supreme Court opinions by former Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Brennan, in which the justices articulate the existence of mini-marketplaces,
with the possibility of different regulatory schemes depending on each
unique marketplace.' 6
Having established the background necessary for an understanding of
the Marketplace theory, Part II of this Note will next turn to the application
of these concepts in the context of social media. Social media's design open-
ly embraces the Marketplace theory; it enables virtually anyone to
contribute his comments, thoughts, and ideas to the conversation. These
characteristics are equally applicable to social media's use as a resource
during emergencies and public health crises." However, the intersection of
social media and emergency situations is where the pure Marketplace theory
begins to break down and the false assumptions of the model that Schauer
exposed begin to show.'8 Part III of this Note explores three main discon-
nects with the Marketplace theory and its application to social media and
emergencies: 1) time for vast quantities of information to filter through the
system, 2) potential negative effects as a result of false or counterproductive
information, and 3) vetting the trustworthiness of sources.
We will first deal with the issue of time and the social media Market-
place. While social media enables an instantaneous and efficacious
presentation of various ideas and viewpoints in a short timeframe, 9 it is far
from certain that social media will enable the Marketplace to arrive at the
best, most efficient solution to an emergency incident in time for the solu-
14. Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of
Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. I (2004).
15. Id. at 3-4.
16. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 598
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); City of Madison Joint Sch. Dist. No. 8 v. Wis. Emp't Rela-
tions Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167, 178 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring); see also W. Wat Hopkins,
The Supreme Court Defines the Marketplace of Ideas, 73 JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. Q.,
Spring 1996, at 40.
17. See Merchant, supra note 4 (describing recent usages of social media by individuals
during emergencies and crises).
18. SCHAUER, supra note 10.
19. See ALAN CANN ET AL., SOCIAL MEDIA: A GUIDE FOR RESEARCHERS 40 (2011),
available at http://www.rin.ac.uk/system/files/attachments/social-media-guide-for screen_
0.pdf (discussing the speed of communication and increased productivity of social media in
the context of research).
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tion to make a difference. This time constraint is further exacerbated by the
increased quantity of user-generated information that social media produces
and the Marketplace's need to filter this information 20 rapidly enough for it
to be useful during an emergency or public health crisis.
Interrelated to the timeliness issue is the possibility that a social media
Marketplace will promulgate false or counterproductive information and
advice that has not had time to properly filter through the Market, which
will be instantly relied upon because of the urgency created by a crisis or
disaster.21 The social media Marketplace is not designed to instantaneously
produce the best ideas. 22 Arriving at the best answer often takes discussion,
debate, and an ability to digest all available viewpoints; 23 a crisis or emer-
gency does not present the opportunity to engage in any of these activities to
the extent necessary for the Marketplace to properly function. 24 The result
may be that individuals, groups, and organizations take conflicting, false, or
inaccurate advice in an attempt to solve the crisis, ultimately inhibiting pro-
gress.25
The final issue that arises in the context of the social media Marketplace
is separating trustworthy from non-trustworthy social media sources. This
vetting of sources does not concern well-recognized agencies that are dis-
seminating information and advice via social media. Rather, it arises when
individuals post their own observations and ideas in the social media Mar-
ketplace. These individuals are likely unknown to social media users and
likewise the veracity of their statements is unreliable. 26 Determining which
sources to trust is seemingly impossible without undertaking an independent
investigation into the veracity of their claims.
Lastly, Part IV of this Note will propose self-regulation as a potential
solution to the disconnects between the Marketplace and social media's use
during an emergency or crisis. This Note will argue for a system of freedom
of expression where self-regulatory structures exist to manage discourse and
structure public debate, rather than a dialectical free-for-all in a pure Mar-
ketplace model. Relying on the theories of Justices Brennan and
20. See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation & Discourse in Cy-
berspace, 49 DUKE L.J. 855, 902-03 (2000) (noting that in the context of financial message
boards, too many participants offering their opinions in public discourse "may lead to truth,
but it may also lead to the Tower of Babel").
21. See SCHAUER, supra note 10, at 30.
22. See id. at 27 (noting that over long durations of time the traditional Marketplace
theory will correct itself, but it is not an instantaneous process).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 30.
25. See BRUCE R. LINDSAY, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., R41987, SOCIAL MEDIA AND
DISASTERS: CURRENT USES, FUTURE OPTIONS, AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONs 7 (2011).
26. Peter Steiner, On the Internet, Nobody Knows You're a Dog, THE NEW YORKER,
July 5, 1993, at 61, available at http://www.unc.eduldepts/jomc/academics/dri/idog.htmi (de-
picting cartoon stating "On the Internet, nobody knows you're a dog.").
631Spring 2012]1
632 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review
Rehnquist, 27 this Note will then argue that social media use during an emer-
gency or crisis creates its own mini-marketplace subject to its own unique
regulatory scheme-a scheme of self-regulation. Having proposed this po-
tential solution, Part V of this Note will then analyze case studies in which
social media was used during an emergency or crisis. These case studies
will reveal the use of self-regulation, thus demonstrating the Marketplace's
ability to adapt in order to overcome the disconnects that arise in the context
of the use of social media during emergencies and crises.
I. THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS
A. Foundations: A Brief History and Underlying
Assumptions of the Theory
Freedom of speech plays an important role in the Marketplace theory
because it is believed to be the best means to achieve the desired result-
discovery of the truth.28 The Marketplace theory's origins can trace as far
back as John Milton,29 Enlightenment thinkers like John Locke" and Adam
Smith," and judicial opinions on free speech theory by influential jurists
like Chief Justice Holmes.32 Holmes' analysis is of particular relevance. He
argued that the Marketplace theory underlies the principles of freedom of
speech in the First Amendment." He felt that "the best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the mar-
ket."34 This theory is what we commonly refer to as the "Marketplace of
Ideas." It is a theory that "truth will most likely surface when all opinions
may freely be expressed, when there is an open and unregulated market for
the trade in ideas."" The Marketplace theory relies on the value that our
27. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
598 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); City of Madison Joint Sch. Dist. No. 8 v. Wis. Emp't
Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167, 178 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring).
28. See SCHAUER, supra note 10, at 15 ("Open discussion, free exchange of ideas, free-
dom of enquiry, and freedom to criticize . . . are necessary conditions for the effective
functioning of the process of searching for truth. Without this freedom we are said to be des-
tined to stumble blindly between truth and falsehood.").
29. See JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA (Thomas H. Luxon ed., The Milton Reading Room
2008) (1644), available at http://www.dartmouth.edu/-milton/reading-room/areopagitica/
index.shtml.
30. See JOHN LOCKE, The Second Treatise of Government. in Two TREATISES OF Gov-
ERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1960) (1690).
31. See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS (Edwin Cannan ed., U. Chi. Press 1976) (1776).
32. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Abrams
v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630-31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
33. See Hopkins, supra note 16, at 41; see also SCHAUER, supra note 10, at 15-16.
34. See Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630-31 (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also Robert Post,
Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 88 CALIF. L. REv. 2353,
2359-60 (2000).
35. SCHAUER, supra note 10, at 16.
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society places in the adversarial process for finding the truth and on an un-
derstanding, akin to Adam Smith's "invisible hand" theory36 that when all
thoughts and ideas are allowed to enter the market, the best will prevail." In
addition to this basic premise, Marketplace theorists believe that freedom of
speech is the best means of identifying and ultimately accepting the truth.38
This competition or "survival theory of truth" rests on two primary as-
sumptions that are somewhat contested (and as we will later see, these
assumptions are particularly troublesome when applied to social media and
emergencies). First, the Marketplace theory assumes that reason will be able
to discern what is true from what is false and that the entire public possesses
the capability to use reason for that purpose. 39 Thus, only if the public is
using reason, when contributing to and critiquing the ideas of others, will
the model work.40 Without the use of reason by all Marketplace participants,
it would not take much imagination to envision a scenario in which a false
idea could be accepted as true.
There are two counter-arguments that allow the Marketplace theory to
survive this hypothetical, where reason is not employed by all participants.
First, Schauer recognizes that the size and diversity of the public at large
make it the ideal group to propose the variety of ideas necessary for the
Marketplace theory to operate.4 1 However, he diverges from traditional
Marketplace theory because he does not believe that the public at large nec-
essarily needs to be the group that decides whether the idea is true or not.42
Therefore, this conception of the Marketplace does not rely as heavily on
the reasoning power of the public. Rather, it relies on the reasoning power of
a subset of the public at large. A second counter-argument to the hypothet-
ical where reason is not employed by all participants is that the Marketplace
theory is not designed to instantly produce the correct answer.43 Reason will
36. See Smith, supra note 31 (stating that the invisible hand theory is a term for the
economic theory that competition in the marketplace for goods or services that is individual,
unregulated, and motivated by self-interest will ultimately lead to prices that collectively re-
flect society's valuation of the individual goods or services).
37. SCHAUER, supra note 10, at 16.
38. See Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE
L.J. 1, 3 (1984); see also SCHAUER, supra note 10, at 16.
39. See Hopkins, supra note 16, at 44; see also SCHAUER, supra note 10, at 26.
40. See Ingber, supra note 38, at 15.
41. SCHAUER, supra note 10, at 27.
42. Id. at 28; see also infra Part I.E (discussing the existence of mini-marketplaces
which would include subsets of the public at large as comprising the Marketplace participants
as opposed to the public at large).
43. SCHAUER, supra note 10, at 27; see also Ingber, supra note 38, at 17-19 (discussing
the insufficient time during an emergency situation and the subsequent deficiency of the Mar-
ketplace to arrive at the best answer); Joseph Blocher, Institutions in the Marketplace of Ideas,
57 DUKE L.J. 821, 826 (2008) (noting the transaction cost of time to "find, evaluate, and ob-
tain good ideas" and the fact that time is not accounted for in the traditional Marketplace
metaphor).
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prevail and correct the false view previously accepted as the truth over
time."
The second underlying assumption of the Marketplace theory is that
bringing all ideas and opinions-both true and false-to the open market
will lead to increased knowledge through competition.4 5 By bringing all
possible ideas and opinions to the market, knowledge will be increased over
time as society sifts through all possible answers, using reason to ultimately
arrive at the best one.46 In regards to this assumption, John Stuart Mill noted
that it is only once we have heard all views of others that we will know
when a certain view is the best one.47 Schauer begins to poke holes in this
assumption of the Marketplace theory and in Mill's statement by noting that
hearing a contradictory point of view may help us to accept the truth of a
statement, but it is not a necessary condition to an acknowledgement of the
statement's truth. 48 The recognition that contradictory viewpoints are not
always necessary is just the beginning of Schauer's pushback on the tradi-
tional Marketplace theory's conception that there is a need for complete
freedom of speech in the Marketplace. 49
Having questioned the necessity for complete freedom of speech, many
Marketplace theorists consider the potential benefits of suppressing or regu-
lating some speech as an alternative to a pure Marketplace theory. 0 Just as
false statements and opinions are not necessarily self-evidently false, neither
are true statements and opinions self-evidently truthful-both need more
than mere expression in order to be recognized for what they are."' It does
not logically follow that truth is accepted-or falsity rejected-just because
it is heard.52 Because false statements and opinions will not automatically be
recognized as false, and because the Marketplace theory requires that this
speech be permitted regardless of its truth, it is possible that the Marketplace
theory can actually inhibit the public's acquisition of knowledge." There-
fore, unless truth is always self-evident (which has already been dismissed
as a possibility), Schauer believes that we cannot assume that open debate
44. SCHAUER, supra note 10, at 27.
45. Ingber, supra note 38, at 6; see also SCHAUER, supra note 10, at 17, 24-25.
46. Ingber, supra note 38, at 6.
47. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty and Considerations on Representative Government
13-48 (R. McCallum ed., 1948); see also Ingber, supra note 38, at 6; SCHAUER, supra note 10,
at 24.
48. SCHAUER, supra note 10, at 21.
49. See Post, supra note 34, at 2363 (discussing the possibility of Constitutional regula-
tion of speech).
50. Id.
51. See SCHAUER, supra note 10, at 25.
52. See Hopkins, supra note 16, at 44-45; see also Ingber, supra note 38, at 15 (de-
scribing assumptions of the Marketplace, one of which is "truth must be discoverable and
susceptible of substantiation").
53. SCHAUER, supra note 10, at 33 ("[Ajdditional propositions can retard knowledge as
well as advance it.").
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and discussion will always result in information that is more beneficial, use-
ful, and efficient than that which comes from a controlled Marketplace
where speech is suppressed or regulated."4 Given that open debate will not
always prove beneficial to discovering the truth, Marketplace theorists next
ask whether to consider suppressing certain information and, if so, what
information may potentially be suppressed.
B. Suppression: Is All Information Good?
Although contrary to the Marketplace theory, there may be instances in
which the suppression of statements or ideas benefits the discovery of truth
and knowledge.55 As has already been asserted, neither true nor false state-
ments are necessarily self-evident.56 When neither truth nor falsity is
self-evident in the Marketplace, it is inevitable that some false propositions
will arise and gain popular acceptance in the Marketplace, until years later
when new information arises that proves the old proposition to be false.5 1 In
the short-run, the false idea was perceived to be true, but over the long-run
the Marketplace corrected itself as new information was introduced.5 1
Schauer rejects this argument that truth and reason will prevail in the long-
run, finding it meaningless to the discovery of truth unless the Marketplace's
self-correcting mechanism is limited to a finite time period within which it
will correct itself.59 Therefore, he entertains the idea that the suppression of
ideas perceived to be false is a way to better discover the truth and increase
our knowledge.'
The negative implications of suppressing speech and ideas may be quite
obvious to anyone raised in a society where freedom of speech is revered, as
it is in the United States. 61 First and foremost, suppressing statements and
ideas that we believe to be false in order to protect the Marketplace from
adopting falsities will necessarily also suppress some statements that are in
fact true.62 Thus, suppressing speech is harmful because it cuts off access to
possible knowledge. 63 Second, even if the asserted statement or opinion is in
fact false, there is value in identifying the error of the argument.64
54. Id.
55. Id. at 28 ("[T]he predominant risk is that false views may, despite their falsity, be
accepted by the public, who will then act in accordance with those false views.").
56. Id. at 33.
57. For example, for many years, people thought the world was flat until over time new
information surfaced proving that this previously widely held belief was false.
58. SCHAUER, supra note 10, at 27.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 29.
61. See Ingber, supra note 38, at 4.
62. See Mill, supra note 47, at 13-48; see also SCHAUER, supra note 10, at 22 (discuss-
ing Mill's analysis); Ingber, supra note 38, at 6 (discussing Mill's analysis in ON LIBERTY).
63. See SCHAUER, supra note 10, at 29.
64. Id. at 25 ("The identification of error may not bring us closer to truth, but the identi-
fication of an error is still desirable, and the rejection of an erroneous belief is still an
635Spring 2012]
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However, even given these rationales against suppression, Schauer still
leaves open the possibility that suppression may be warranted in circum-
stances where the expression of certain speech carries with it the possibility
of harm.6 1 He notes that in instances where speech is believed to be harmful,
the appropriate question to ask is whether it is worth the risk of promulgat-
ing the statement compared to the small possibility that the statement will be
beneficial. 66 He acknowledges that we are guessing when we decide to sup-
press a statement, but we are likewise taking a guess when we decide not to
suppress a statement. 67 For this reason, he concludes that "[s]uppression is
necessarily wrong only if the former harm is ignored. Therefore a rule abso-
lutely prohibiting suppression is justified only if speech can never cause
harm, or if the search for truth is elevated to a position of priority over all
other values." 68
C. Emergencies: Suppression Required?
One instance where theorists view suppression of false and harmful
statements as beneficial-if not necessary-is in the event of an emergen-
cy. 69 Rational thinking, which the Marketplace theory assumes is present, is
necessary for the model to work.70 In instances where this key assumption
breaks down, there is no reason to rely on the Marketplace model at all to
justify free speech." One such instance in which rational thinking breaks
down occurs in an emergency. 72 As Justice Brandeis noted in his concurring
opinion in Whitney v. California, "If there be time to expose through discus-
sion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of
education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.
Only an emergency can justify repression."73 An emergency situation thus
may represent the possibility of a Marketplace failure." Schauer elaborates
on why an emergency can justify suppression:
When because of emergency, passion, or anger, there is not oppor-
tunity to reflect on the wisdom of an expressed opinion, and there is
epistemic advance ... allowing the expression of contrary views is the only rational way of
recognizing human fallibility, and making possible the rejection or modification of those of
our beliefs that are erroneous.").
65. Id. at 29.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See, e.g., Ingber, supra note 38, at 18.
70. See Blocher, supra note 43 (discussing use of reason as an underlying assumption
of the Marketplace theory).
71. See SCHAUER, supra note 10, at 30 ("Neither the argument from truth nor any other
argument can be applied when the conditions for its validity are not present.").
72. See, e.g., Ingber, supra note 38, at 18.
73. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
74. Blocher, supra note 43, at 833.
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no opportunity for counter-argument, there is no reason to rely on
the argument from truth... . At such times there is less justification
for allowing expression of the apparently false opinion.75
The classic example of an emergency justifying suppression, relied upon
universally by Marketplace theorists, is Holmes' articulation of "clear and
present danger," where a theater-goer shouts "Fire!" in a crowded theater
when there is no fire.76 Schauer further notes that "[ilt would be most unrea-
sonable to say that such expression should be permitted because others have
the opportunity to express the opinion that there is no fire, followed by
discussion and investigation to determine which of the two opinions was
correct."77 The costs of communication, particularly the cost of time, have
the potential to prevent the proper operation of the Marketplace.78 Thus, the
potential for Marketplace failure in an emergency situation is greater and the
cost of that failure is high. 79 Schauer makes a compelling case regarding the
breakdown of the Marketplace model under emergency circumstances, but
perhaps he and other legal and philosophical theorists go too far by suggest-
ing that speech should be suppressed. Rather than suppressing speech in its
entirety, perhaps freedom of speech in the Marketplace simply needs to be a
bit more constrained in emergency situations.
D. Regulation
Professor Jack Balkin, in his article entitled Digital Speech and Demo-
cratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression for the Information
Society, provides the theoretical basis for the application of a solution that is
less severe than outright suppression of speech.80 Balkin begins by noting
that the digital age and the Internet have accentuated some of the character-
istics of freedom of expression.8 ' For one, he notes that the digital age has
made us ever more aware of what he calls the "scarcity of audience atten-
tion" and "dilut[ion of] the audience share."82 The arrival of the digital age is
drastically lowering the costs of distributing speech. 83 As a result, more
75. SCHAUER, supra note 10, at 30.
76. See, e.g., Blocher, supra note 43, at 833-34 (discussing Schenk v. United States,
249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919)) ("The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a
man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre.... The question in every case is whether the words
used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.").
77. SCHAUER, supra note 10, at 30.
78. Blocher, supra note 43, at 834.
79. Id.
80. Balkin, supra note 14, at 3-4 (promoting a theory of freedom of speech that he calls
the "democratic culture" which "is about individual liberty as well as collective self-
governance").
81. Id. at 3.
82. Id. at 7, 10.
83. Id. at 7.
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people are able to distribute content, which is also easier to receive, and
competition for an audience's attention increases as the sheer quantity of
content increases.' He notes that this phenomenon has highlighted "the im-
portance of organizing, sorting, filtering, and limiting access to
information."" All of these activities are very much regulatory in nature.
While not directly advocating for such a system,86 the importance Balkin
places on the above activities implies the need to regulate content to some
extent.
Balkin's subsequent analysis indicates that the dawn of the digital age
coincided with a deregulation of freedom of expression. He notes that be-
fore the digital revolution, the information system in place used mass media
entities and publishing houses as "traditional gatekeepers of content and
quality.""8 These traditional media entities have always played a significant
role in information regulation because they filter all information that they
produce for the public.8 1 In our digital age where anyone can rapidly distrib-
ute information to the public at large, the emerging online environment
means that freedom of expression is no longer as closely intertwined with
these gatekeepers. 89 However, Balkin notes that the Internet has not replaced
traditional media entities, but rather has formed an additional layer of free-
dom of expression on top of the preexisting system.90
Balkin raises one final argument that will apply later in exploring the
disconnects between the Marketplace theory and the use of social media as a
resource during emergencies. He argues that freedom of expression in the
digital age would be best served by promoting deliberation on public issues
based on the idea of a "democratic culture." 9' In other words, freedom of
speech in the digital age should be about individual liberty-which allows
everyone to participate in the distribution of ideas-while having some form
of collective self-governing regulatory structure in place, much like the po-
litical institution of a democracy, to manage discourse and organize public
debate. 92 The need for the regulatory scheme exists because of the possibil-
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See Balkin, supra note 14; see also supra note 80 and accompanying text.
87. Balkin, supra note 14, at 9.
88. Id. at 10 (noting that access to mass media is limited to a few controlling entities).
89. Id. at 10-11 (commenting that the digital age has allowed users to rout around these
traditional entities and reach audiences directly as well as "glomming on" or taking a product
developed by a mass media entity and "appropriating things, commenting on them, criticizing,
and above all, producing and constructing things with them: using them as building blocks or
raw materials for innovation and commentary").
90. Id. at 9-10.
91. Id. at 28.
92. Id. at 3-4 ("Democratic culture is about individual liberty as well as collective self-
governance; it is about each individual's ability to participate in the production and
distribution of culture. Freedom of speech allows ordinary people to participate freely in the
spread of ideas.").
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ity of free speech market failures in certain instances such as emergencie 9 3
where the assumptions of the Marketplace theory break down. 94 As Balkin
notes, "Democratic culture is a regulative ideal."95 Along with the regulatory
need to sort, filter, and process the vast amounts of information with which
we are presented,96 this "democratic culture" concept of freedom of expres-
sion is a second manifestation of regulatory elements in an adapted
Marketplace theory. Granted, this is not a pure Marketplace theory, but ra-
ther one that has adapted to the changing circumstances of the digital age.
E. Varying Regulatory Schemes in Mini-Marketplaces
Former Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Brennan have each implied
(though never outright stated) in their judicial opinions that instead of one
overarching Marketplace, there exist "mini-marketplaces," each with the
potential for their own regulatory schemes.97 W. Wat Hopkins, in his article
The Supreme Court Defines the Marketplace of Ideas, argues that critics of
the Marketplace theory lump all ideas into one overarching marketplace and
then critique the theory when truth doesn't magically emerge. 98 Hopkins
examines the judicial opinions of Rehnquist and Brennan and argues that
contrary to the critics of the Marketplace theory, the Supreme Court
implicitly recognizes the existence of mini-marketplaces instead of one
overarching marketplace."
Former Chief Justice Rehnquist, in his dissenting opinion in Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation v. Public Service Commission of New
York, implicitly acknowledges the existence of different mini-marketplaces
and varying regulatory schemes for each unique mini-marketplace.'"
Rehnquist notes that "in the world of political advocacy and its marketplace
of ideas. . . . [tihe free flow of information is important in this context."o
Rehnquist makes it clear that he is talking only about the marketplace for
the world of political advocacy and that the lack of a regulatory scheme is
only applicable in that context; his use of italics for the word "its" further
strengthens his point. Immediately following his analysis on the market-
place for political advocacy, Rehnquist states that "[t]he notion that more
speech is the remedy to expose falsehood and fallacies is wholly out of
93. Blocher, supra note 43, at 833.
94. See supra Part l.A.
95. Balkin, supra note 14, at 49.
96. Id. at 28.
97. Hopkins, supra note 16, at 46-47 ("Members of the Court, then, have implied that
broadcasting, governmental negotiations, and local communities inhabit their own mini-
marketplaces, as do commercial and political speech.").
98. Id. at 45.
99. Id. at 46-47.
100. Cent. Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 598
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
101. Id.
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place in the commercial bazaar."' 02 Rehnquist is directly contrasting the
need for complete freedom of speech in the context of political advocacy
with the need for a stricter regulatory scheme in the context of the
commercial bazaar or marketplace.Io Thus, Rehnquist explicitly articulates
the existence of different regulatory schemes for certain types of speech and
in doing so implicitly acknowledges that these distinct mini-marketplaces
exist via their relation to the different regulatory schemes.
Likewise, Justice Brennan, in his concurring opinion in City of Madi-
son, Joint School District No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Commission, recognizes the existence of differing free speech regulatory
schemes for different contexts." Brennan does so by first acknowledging
that, in the specific context of a closed bargaining session, there is nothing
unconstitutional about restricting who can speak to those designated repre-
sentatives of the union. 0 In this context, the regulatory scheme is
permissible. Brennan then immediately applies this permissible regulatory
scheme to the context of a public forum.0 6 When applied in the context of a
public forum, he finds this regulatory scheme is violative of the First
Amendment. 0 7 Brennan implicitly recognizes the distinct mini-marketplace
of a closed bargaining session and the constitutionality of the unique regula-
tory scheme that applies to it.
While it is beyond the scope of this Note to discuss at length the exact
mini-marketplaces that the justices envision (e.g., commercial speech,
broadcast industry, political speech, individual classrooms, etc.) and the dif-
ferences among them, it is significant that members of the Supreme Court
acknowledge the existence of these mini-marketplaces that may each have
their own unique regulatory scheme.' The existence of mini-marketplaces
allows the Marketplace theory to better function in light of the issues sur-
rounding the Marketplace's two major assumptions. 09 If the participants in
102. Id.
103. See Bazaar, THESAURUS, http://thesaurus.com/browse/bazaar (last visited Mar. 28,
2012) (noting that marketplace is a synonym for bazaar).
104. City of Madison Joint Sch. Dist. No. 8 v. Wis. Emp't Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S.
167, 178-79 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring).
105. Id. at 178 ("[T]here is nothing unconstitutional about legislation commanding that
in closed bargaining sessions a government body may admit, hear the views of, and respond to
only the designated representatives of a union selected by the majority of its employees.").
106. Id. at 178-79 ("But the First Amendment plays a crucially different role when, as
here, a government body has ... determined to open its decisionmaking processes to public
view and participation. In such case, the state body has created a public forum dedicated to the
expression of views by the general public.").
107. Id. at 179 (quoting Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972)) ("Once a forum
is opened up to assembly or speaking by some groups, government may not prohibit others
from assembling or speaking on the basis of what they intend to say.").
108. Hopkins, supra note 16, at 46.
109. See Balkin, supra note 14 (discussing the two major assumptions of the Market-
place that (1) all participants are acting rationally and (2) that open debate is always
beneficial).
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a mini-marketplace are regulated-either by external regulations or by self-
regulation-then it seems more likely that those participating in the
regulated mini-marketplace will be knowledgeable in the subject matter or
context of the mini-marketplace. If those individuals come to the mini-
marketplace knowledgeable in the subject matter, it seems more likely that
their contributions to the mini-marketplace of ideas will be more thoughtful,
rational ideas. If they are better thought-out rational ideas, it also seems
more likely that the open debate among these ideas is much more likely to
be beneficial in the search for the truth. The importance of the Court's
recognition of this concept will be discussed in Part V, where I will apply
the concept of the mini-marketplace and argue that social media, when used
during an emergency or crisis, creates its own mini-marketplace subject to a
unique self-regulatory scheme.
F. Conclusions on the Marketplace of Ideas
The works of Schauer, Balkin, Holmes, Rehnquist, Brennan, and vari-
ous other legal and philosophical theorists result in varying conceptions of
the role that freedom of expression plays in the Marketplace theory."o Mar-
ketplace theorists note the necessary assumptions of rationality and open
discourse that the Marketplace theory in its purest form relies on, but these
theorists also express skepticism that these assumptions will necessarily be
true."' Of particular importance is the argument that the assumption of ra-
tionality completely breaks down when the Marketplace theory is applied to
an emergency context.1 2 Theorists predict little chance of the Marketplace
functioning in such an event, and many dismiss the possibility that truth can
be determined and knowledge increased because of the particular urgency of
the situation.1 But perhaps Schauer and other theorists assume too much
by finding that the Marketplace entirely breaks down in these circumstances.
Perhaps instead the Marketplace theory can survive while slightly adapting
to the factual circumstances of an emergency that alter some of the assump-
tions of the theory. A regulatory scheme-a structure that helps guide the
"invisible hand" in its selection of the truth and expansion of knowledge-
may be all that is necessary to avoid scrapping the Marketplace theory
altogether.
Balkin's work on freedom of speech in the new digital age helps illus-
trate the possibility that an adapted Marketplace theory fits the needs of our
current media structure." 4 Balkin's belief that our current conception of
freedom of expression in the digital age would be best served by promoting
deliberation on public issues based on the idea of a "democratic culture" is
110. See supra Part I.
111. See supra Part I.
112. See supra Part I.C.
113. See supra Part I.C.
114. See supra Part I.D.
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of particular note.' 15 The "democratic culture's" role in the Marketplace is
twofold; it encourages individual liberty of freedom of speech as well as
collective self-governance."l 6 As Balkin notes, "Democratic culture is a reg-
ulative ideal."'" Going forward, Balkin's work provides an intermediate
approach between the pure Marketplace theory and total abandonment of
the Marketplace theory when faced with an emergency situation.
Lastly, the judicial opinions of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Brennan offer the possibility of sub-categorizing the Marketplace into mini-
marketplaces that can each be examined in their own particular context." 8
Additionally, these mini-marketplaces are potentially subject to unique regu-
latory schemes," 9 which enable each Marketplace to adapt to the unique
context and challenges that freedom of expression faces in each situation.
II. THE MARKETPLACE'S APPLICATION TO SOCIAL MEDIA IN GENERAL:
SOCIAL MEDIA EMBRACES MAJOR CHARACTERISTICS
OF THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS
Social media may be the purest application of the "Marketplace of Ide-
as" theory. Social media takes the essential element of freedom of speech
and provides a forum for expression with greater breadth and depth than
ever before. Anyone with an Internet connection is able to register a free
account with a social media provider, which then allows the user to express
his thoughts and share his comments on any topic. 20 Social media embraces
several core Marketplace concepts: (1) the competition of ideas; (2) the pub-
lic at large as the best provider of ideas; and (3) the value of exposure to
contradictory points in the search for truth."'
The concept of the competition of ideas on the open market is the key
component to the Marketplace theory,' 22 and social media wholly embraces
the competition of ideas and its test for truth. Scholars have long champi-
oned an idealized version of the Internet as the living embodiment of the
Marketplace.123 The Internet and social media allow the user to generate
content that can be distributed locally and globally with little to no cost to
the user.124 By enabling more individuals to express their views and by giv-
ing the user's speech or expression access to a larger audience,125 social
115. See supra Part I.D.
116. See supra Part I.D.
117. Balkin, supra note 14, at 49.
118. Supra Part I.E.
119. Supra Part I.E.
120. See Kern, supra note 1.
121. See supra Part L.A.
122. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. at 630-31. See also Post, supra note 34, at
2359-60.
123. See Lidsky, supra note 20, at 893.
124. See Balkin, supra note 14, at 13.
125. Id. at 7.
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media expands the test for truth. An idea or statement gaining nearly world-
wide acceptance on an open and unregulated market of ideas is strong
evidence of the truth of the proffered idea or statement.126 Exposure, ac-
ceptance, and survival of that idea or statement over time further solidifies
its truth and leads to an overall increase in society's knowledge.
Underlying the concept of the competition of ideas on the open market
is the understanding that the public at large is the best provider of ideas for
the market.127 It is easy to see how social media wholeheartedly embraces
this key component of the Marketplace. The Internet and social media re-
duce barriers to entry in the Marketplace and consequently allow a greater
number of people to contribute their ideas to the market.128 However, it is
not just a high volume of people that the Marketplace seeks.129 Rather, the
Marketplace seeks diverse opinions and beliefs.130 By expanding exposure
and contribution of ideas on a global scale, social media is able to encom-
pass the widest possible range of diverse opinions.'31 The Internet helped
remove the preexisting barriers that prevented one from expressing himself
through speech, and it also removed barriers to that speech being heard by
others.132
The role of traditional mass media entities like newspapers and televi-
sion, regardless of their acceptance of a wide range of viewpoints, has
always troubled pure Marketplace theorists.133 Specifically, mass media enti-
ties, in the interest of time and limited resources, have to act as gatekeepers
with regards to content and quality of the issues discussed.134 Traditional
mass media entities still have a significant impact on the quality and content
of discussion topics.' 35 However, because the Internet and social media are
widely available to the public on a global scale, they are able to draw from
mass media, broaden exposure to issues up for debate, discuss issues that
mass media entities do not raise, and generate a greater number and a more
diverse selection of ideas.136 By stripping control of information from tradi-
tional mass media and increasing the public's control over content, the
126. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630-31 (1919).
127. See SCHAUER, supra note 10, at 27.
128. See Lidsky, supra note 20, at 894-95.
129. Id. (discussing how eliminating barriers to participation in the Marketplace of Ideas
makes public discourse more democratic and inclusive).
130. Id. at 893-94 ("Ideally, the process of interacting in the marketplace of ideas .
enables citizens to transcend their differences in order to forge consensus on issues of public
concern . . . .").
131. Id. at 894.
132. Id. at 895.
133. See Balkin, supra note 14, at 7 ("Before the Internet, free speech theorists worried
about the scarcity of bandwidth for broadcast media.... [O~nly a relatively few people could
broadcast to a large number of people.").
134. Id. at 7-10.
135. Id. at 9-10.
136. See Balkin, supra note 14, at 9-10; Lidsky, supra note 20, at 897-98.
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Internet and social media may help contribute to the development of the
body of informed citizens that the traditional Marketplace theory seeks."'
A critical component of virtually all social media websites is the ability
for users to comment on the content generated by other users. 3 8 This com-
mentary includes both positive feedback and criticism. This behavior
embraces the Marketplace theory's belief that hearing contradictory or even
false points of view has value in the search for truth.13 9 Positive feedback
and commentary may indicate that there may be some degree of truth to the
opinion or statement. Over time and with increased exposure, the truth of
the opinion or statement will be revealed and society can either accept or
reject it.140 Criticism or outright rejection of the opinion or statement is
equally as valuable because the criticism may have merit. Likewise, the
truth of the criticism itself can be evaluated over time, and, given increased
exposure, the search for the truth will be advanced by acceptance or rejec-
tion of the criticism. Even clearly false commentary will have value in the
search for truth by demonstrating the error of the false commentary's rea-
soning.141 Granted, the social media user may have some control over
whether he allows others to comment on his original post, but the principle
remains that social media creates a forum in which freedom of speech in its
purest form is available through criticism and commentary.
III. BREAKDOWN OF THE MARKETPLACE:
DISCONNECTS BETWEEN THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS
AND THE USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA DURING EMERGENCIES
AND PUBLIC HEALTH CRISES
The core Marketplace concepts generally embodied in social media are
equally applicable to the operation of social media as a resource during an
emergency or public health crisis. However, this intersection between social
media and emergencies is where the pure Marketplace concept begins to
break down and the false assumptions of the model exposed by Schauer
begin to show. As discussed in Part I, two major false assumptions that
Schauer finds critical to the Marketplace theory are: 1) that reason prevails
amongst all members of society and 2) that open debate and discussion are
137. See Lidsky, supra note 20, at 897.
138. See Douglass Dowty, You've Got a friend at the PSB: Syracuse Police Department
Introduces its Facebook Page, POST-STANDARD, 12 (Feb. 17, 2011), http://www.
syracuse.com/news/index.ssf/2011/02/syracuse-police-accessible-to.htmi (noting social me-
dia as a method for the public to communicate with the police department and vice versa);
Emergency Management on Social Networks, (May 14, 2009, 9:51 AM),
http://www.alachuacounty.us/Depts/Communications/Pages/Detail.aspx?itemlD=838 (discuss-
ing the ability of users to ask questions, send messages, and obtain helpful information).
139. See Ingber, supra note 38 at 6; see also SCHAUER, supra note 10, at 17, 24-25.
140. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630-31 (1919).
141. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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always beneficial because society will eventually be guided towards the
truth.14 2 When these assumptions are applied to the specific context of using
social media as a resource during an emergency or public health crisis, three
main disconnects between the Marketplace theory and its application to so-
cial media emerge: 1) time for vast quantities of information to filter
through the system; 2) potential negative effects of false or counterproduc-
tive information; and 3) vetting the trustworthiness of sources.143 It is
important to note at the outset that the exploration of these disconnects
largely occurs within the context of information and opinions posted by an
individual user as opposed to a specialized group or governmental organiza-
tion (such as the CDC or FEMA) using social media as a means to more
rapidly and efficiently promulgate its message to the public.'44 The infor-
mation generally sought by those accessing social media during an
emergency or crisis is typically user-generated content rather than group or
governmental content. 145 Social media use by a group or governmental or-
ganization during an emergency or crisis much more closely resembles the
way in which a traditional mass media entity disseminates information; it
acts as a gatekeeper to the content and quality of the information it chooses
to make available. 14 6
A. Disconnect #1: Time for the Marketplace to Filter
Vast Quantities of Information
The availability of an extended period of time and the Marketplace's
ability to correct itself over the long-run are luxuries that are simply not pre-
sent during an emergency situation or public health crisis.'47 In order for the
Marketplace to work properly, time is required to filter out the true
142. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
143. These three disconnects are generally applicable to the Marketplace theory, but
their effect is exacerbated when applied to the specific context of social media and emergen-
cies. See supra Part I.
144. See Emergency Management on Social Networks, (May 14, 2009, 9:51 AM),
http://www.alachuacounty.us/Depts/Communications/Pages/Detaii.aspx?itemlD=838; David
Hatch, Social Media: Emergency Response's Next Frontier, NATIONALJOURNAL (May 5, 2011,
2:58 PM), http://www.nationaljoumal.com/tech/social-media-emergency-response-s-next-
frontier-20110505; J. Nicholas Hoover, FEMA to Use Social Media for Emergency Response,
INFORMATIONWEEK (Jan. 19, 2011, 4:00 PM), http://www.informationweek.com/news/
government/info-management/229000918; Pacific University Integrates Facebook, Twitter
into E2Campus Emergency Notification System, CAMPUS SAFETY MAGAZINE (Dec. 06, 2008),
http://www.campussafetymagazine.com/Channel/Emergency-Management/News/ 200 8/12/06/
Pacific-University-Integrates-Facebook-Twitter-into-e2Campus-Emergency-Notification-
System.aspx.
145. LINDSAY, supra note 25, at 3 ("However the main source of information disseminat-
ed and sought after is generally posted by citizens, rather than emergency management
agencies or organizations").
146. See Balkin, supra note 14, at 7-10.
147. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
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information from the false.148 The self-correction mechanism of the Market-
place can only be guaranteed to be effective after this extended duration.'
However, if the purpose of social media use during an emergency or public
health crisis is to rapidly provide useful and accurate information in order to
save lives or mitigate damage,5 0 it is an entirely impractical system if those
in need of information cannot filter the information rapidly enough to make
use of it during the limited duration of the emergency or crisis. In other
words, arriving at the truth behind statements and opinions is all but useless
if not done within the temporal restrictions of the emergency or crisis.
Even if the Marketplace is able, through social media, to filter infor-
mation while the crisis or emergency is taking place, this does not
necessarily mean that social media is the most efficient route to arrive at the
truth of the information or opinions. It is entirely plausible that a single enti-
ty (such as the CDC or FEMA) with specialized knowledge and experience
in emergency management and public health crises would be more efficient
in promulgating information that would be both timely and useful in saving
lives or mitigating damage. However, a situation in which a single entity or
small group of entities is dictating the truth of information completely con-
tradicts the Marketplace theory.'
Further compounding the time constraint problem is the proliferation of
commentary and opinions that results when social media drastically lowers
barriers to entry to the Marketplace.152 More commentary and opinions lead
to more information that the Marketplace has to process, and consequently a
longer expected time for that processing to occur. 53 In a more traditional
context, allowing the greatest number and most diverse array of opinions
and information in the Marketplace ultimately benefits the search for
truth.154 However, in an emergency scenario, this over-abundance of infor-
mation may actually be a barrier to arriving at the truth in an efficient and
timely manner, due to the length of time it takes to sift through all of the
information.' 55 As Senator Scott Brown asked during a recent hearing of the
Senate Homeland Security Subcommittee discussing disaster recovery, "Is
148. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
149. See SCHAUER, supra note 10, at 27.
150. See Daniel O'Brien et al., Improving Infornation and Best Practices for Public
Health Emergency Legal Preparedness, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHics 64, 64-65 (2008) (discussing
the general need for "timely, accurate, and accessible information" for preparedness of all
public health emergencies).
151. See supra Part l.A.
152. See Lidsky, supra note 20, at 894-95.
153. Id. at 902-03 ("[Fjostering a more participatory public discourse may come at a
high cost. Speech from a 'multitude of tongues' may lead to truth, but it may also lead to the
Tower of Babel.").
154. See SCHAUER, supra note 10, at 16.
155. See Joseph Marks, Social Media for Emergency Managers Can't Start When the
Emergency Does, NEXTGOv (Nov. 10, 2011), http://www.nextgov.com/nextgov/ng-201 Ill 1_
4195.php.
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there a point where it's too much information? How do you draw that
line?" 5 6 In a pure Marketplace, there is no saturation point at which there is
too much information. Truth can be derived from any statement or opinion,
whether accurate, contradictory to perceived opinion, or even false."' As
opinions compete for audience attention in the Marketplace, an overabun-
dance of information can ultimately lead to a point where varying
statements or opinions begin to have a dilutive effect on each other.'"8 While
ordinarily this abundance of information would ultimately lead to the truth,
an emergency or crisis situation simply does not provide the time for the
Marketplace to properly function and provide the best answer at the time
when it is most crucial.'59
B. Disconnect #2: Advancing False or Counterproductive Information
on the Marketplace During an Emergency or Public Health Crisis
The promulgation of false or counterproductive information may also
prevent the advancement of truth through the Marketplace in an emergency
or public health crisis. Under a traditional Marketplace theory, any and all
information and opinions are encouraged, even if that information is false.
Because, via the process of elimination, demonstration of the error of faulty
reasoning will ultimately assist in arriving closer to the truth, the search for
truth is advanced.160 False information is not useful during an emergency or
crisis, because the general public may not be acting with the rationality that
the Marketplace theory requires in order to weed out the misinformation.161
Furthermore, the urgency of the situation may result in reliance on misin-
formation, solely because the Marketplace cannot quickly identify the
misinformation as false.162
The dissolution of the Marketplace's underlying assumption of rational-
ity during an emergency or crisis is the Marketplace theorists' basis for
rejecting the application of the Marketplace theory during emergencies.'6 3
These same concerns are amplified when applied to the dissemination of
information through such a powerful tool as social media. When someone
156. Hatch, supra note 144.
157. See supra Part LA, B.
158. See Balkin, supra note 14, at 7 ("My speech has always competed with yours; as
the costs of distribution of speech are lowered, and more and more people can reach each
other easily and cheaply, the competition for audience attention has grown ever more fer-
vent.").
159. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
160. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
161. See SCHAUER, supra note 10, at 30.
162. See Harish Agarwal, Use of Social Media in Crisis Management, EXPRESS COM-
PUTER, http://www.expresscomputeronline.com/20110930/techviews01.shtml (last visited
Mar. 8, 2012) (discussing the potential for information to be misconstrued and relied on dur-
ing emergencies or crises).
163. See supra Part 1.C.
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shouts "Fire!" in a crowded theater,M the speech is constrained to those
physically within earshot, whereas social media enables the shout to literally
be heard around the globe. 165 Assuming that people are not necessarily
thinking rationally 66 when caught in an emergency situation, the social me-
dia Marketplace does not rationally eliminate false and misleading
statements or opinions and will not ensure arrival at the truth or advance-
ment of the search for the truth.
If others are misled in an emergency or crisis situation, whether inten-
tionally or not, such misinformation may directly lead to increased loss of
life, health, or property. 67 When the Marketplace has not had time to pro-
cess the misinformation and identify it as false, those who act on that false
information may exacerbate the crisis. As Harish Agarwal notes in his arti-
cle on the Use of Social Media in Crisis Management, "With the tendency to
sensationalize news that is inherent in human nature, basic information may
get disproportionately misconstrued as a result of which rumors are created,
misleading people with regard to ongoing activities." 68 If there is a greater
risk of proliferation of rumors based on misinformation during an emergen-
cy, the ability of social media to instantly promulgate that rumor to a
worldwide audience is a significant hurdle to overcome, in order to arrive at
the truth through the traditional Marketplace theory. Furthermore, the spread
of false information may serve to increase panic and fear,169 thus furthering
the downward spiral of the potential loss of rationality during an emergency
or crisis. At a minimum, the false information will compete with truthful
information for the audience's time and attention.17 0 Worse still, acceptance
of the false information, even for a short time, will in effect work towards
164. See Blocher, supra note 43; see also supra note 76 and accompanying text.
165. See Balkin, supra note 14, at 13 (discussing the global distribution of content via
social media).
166. See Interview by David V. Johnson with Elaine Scarry, Walter M. Cabot Professor
of Aesthetics & Gen. Theory of Value, Harvard Univ. (July 31, 2011), available at
http://www.bostonreview.net/BR36.4/elaine-scarry-thinking-in-an-emergency.php (discuss-
ing the government's general position that in an emergency there is no time for rational
deliberation); Patrick Tissington, Thinking in an Emergency, TIMES HIGHER EDUCATION (Apr.
14, 2011), http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/story.asp?storyCode=415786&sectioncode
=26 (discussing how politicians have taken debate out of decisions in times of crisis). But see
infra Part IV (arguing that self-regulation of speakers during an emergency or crisis allows the
Marketplace to survive without disturbing its underlying assumptions).
167. See LINDSAY, supra note 25, at 7.
168. See Agarwal, supra note 162.
169. See Thomas A. Glass & Monica Schoch-Spana, Bioterrorism and the People: How to
Vaccinate a City Against Panic, 34 CLINICAL INFECTIOUs DISEASES 217, 220 (2002), available at
http://cid.oxfordjoumals.org/content/34/2/217.full.pdf+html ("The release of inaccurate, confus-
ing or contradictory information by leaders and/or the media has the potential to increase levels
of fear, panic and demoralization, as well as to discredit authorities.").
170. See Balkin, supra note 14, at 7.
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discrediting information that is truthful and can create distrust between the
public and the sources of that truthful information.17 '
A recent Congressional Research Service Report articulated many nega-
tive consequences of the use of social media in emergency situations and
crises that result from the advancement of false or counterproductive infor-
mation.17 2 The Report observed documented instances of social media
disseminating false or outdated information in an emergency or crisis.173
There have been instances where the location of the hazard or threat was
inaccurately reported or a request for help reposted after a victim had al-
ready been rescued.174 The Report further noted that promulgation of this
false or misleading information could complicate awareness of the emergen-
cy incident and slow down response efforts. 75 Furthermore, the Report
hypothesized that social media could also be intentionally used as a mali-
cious tool during an emergency situation to "confuse, disrupt, or otherwise
thwart response efforts." 76 In an emergency or crisis, there is often no time
for the Marketplace to assess ideas, so we cannot assume that rationality
will prevail;'7 7 the urgency of the situation may result in reliance on misin-
formation to the detriment of the pursuit of truth. These conditions lead to a
situation where false or counterproductive information can produce detri-
mental results.
The popularity of social media has grown to the point where major
news entities-such as The New York Times and Reuters-have created so-
cial media editor positions.'78 A social media editor monitors social media
sites during breaking news events-like Hurricane Irene and the uprisings in
the Middle East-to ask eyewitnesses what they are seeing in order to
spread these eyewitness accounts to a larger audience.179 However, the role
of social media editors is expanding and now includes stopping the spread
of misinformation to the public.'80 As a social media editor of The New York
Times recently said, "I think there is a hunger out there for us to debunk
171. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
172. See LINDSAY, supra note 25, at 7.
173. Id. at 6.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 7.
176. Id.; see also Report: Social Media Helpful in Emergencies but Open to Inaccuracy,
IHEALTHBEAT (Sept. 19, 2011), http://www.ihealthbeat.org/articles/2011/9/19/report-social-
media-helpful-in-emergencies-but-open-to-inaccuracy.aspx.
177. See supra Part I.C.
178. See Steve Myers, Social Media Editor Role Expands to Include Fighting Misinfor-
mation During Breaking News, POYNTER (Sept. 2, 2011, 3:33 PM), http://www.poynter.org/
latest-news/making-sense-of-news/I 44848/social-media-editor-role-expands-to-include-
fighting-misinformation-during-breaking-news/; Jeff Sonderman, How the New York Times Is
Taking Twitter Reporting Faster and Deeper with @NYTLive, POYNTER (Aug. 29, 2011, 4:47
PM), http://www.poynter.org/latest-news/media-lab/social-media/144412/how-the-new-york-
times-is-taking-twitter-reporting-faster-and-deeper-with-nytive/.
179. See Myers, supra note 178.
180. Id.
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misinformation when it's out there."'' During the May 2011 tornadoes in
Tuscaloosa, Alabama, rumors proliferated that impeded rescue and recovery
efforts.182 The local newspaper, in an effort to combat these rumors, decided
to create a blog specifically to address and either verify or debunk the ru-
mors.' The effect of rumors and misinformation are accentuated when
distributed through social media because of the speed and breadth of their
distribution.184 For example, in the late summer of 2011 when Hurricane
Irene was heading toward New York City, a picture entitled "Hurricane Irene
approaching North Carolina"'18 spread around the Internet and was viewed
270,000 times.186 However, not only was the picture not taken in North Car-
olina-it was taken in Pensacola, Florida weeks before Irene-but it wasn't
even a picture of Hurricane Irene.'8 1 Social media is a powerful tool, and the
speed and breadth with which material can be distributed makes it difficult
to separate fact from fiction.'
C. Disconnect #3: Vetting out the Trustworthy
from Untrustworthy Sources
A third disconnect between the Marketplace theory and social media
use in the context of an emergency or crisis is the reality that the anonymity
of the Internet and the lack of time and resources available prevent one from
properly distinguishing trustworthy sources from the untrustworthy. Tradi-
tional mass media entities or governmental organizations act as gatekeepers
to the content and quality of the information they promulgate,89 and users
likely have developed preconceived notions of the trustworthiness (or lack
thereof) of each entity based on past experience with that entity. Unlike the-
se traditional mass media entities, social media relies on the individual user
to independently vet sources' trustworthiness. Further complicating this re-
lationship is the fact that during an emergency or crisis, those who turn to
social media for opinions and advice are likely to collect information from a
host of sources which they have never previously relied on. Because of the
181. Id.
182. See Jason Morton, Rumors Hamper Rescue Efforts, TuSCALOOSA NEWS (May 3,
2011, 3:30 AM), http://www.tuscaloosanews.com/article/20110503/NEWS/I10509917; My-
ers, supra note 178.
183. See Storm Rumor Blog, TUSACALOOSA NEWS, http://stormrumors.blogs.
tuscaloosanews.com/?tc=ar (last visited Mar. 28, 2012).
184. See Myers, supra note 178.
185. Hurricane Irene Approaching North Carolina, Tworpic, http://twitpic.com/6caimh
(last visited Mar. 28, 2012).
186. Nick Bilton, Twitter Becomes a Playground During Hurricane Irene, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 28, 2011, 1:36 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/08/28/twitter-becomes-adult-
playground-during-hurricane-irene/?pagewanted=all.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. See Balkin, supra note 14, at 9.
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anonymity of the Internet, they cannot necessarily verify their authentici-
ty.190
Admittedly, the context is not exactly the same, but like social media
users, news reporters that rely on social media posts must make
determinations on the credibility and trustworthiness of a source.19 1 Even
news organizations have been fooled into reporting news stories based on a
false social media source,192 but there are a few factors that these reporters
regularly consider in order to avoid such mistakes. One factor is the social
history of the poster and whether the profile posting the information is brand
new or has a history of activity.'93 The more developed the profile, the more
likely the post is to be authentic.194 Examining this factor alone is insuffi-
cient because a significant amount of social media misinformation arises
from sources who are not liars, but are merely mistaken or themselves mis-
informed.1 95 Another factor to consider is whether or not the person posting
the information is in a position to know what she claims to know.196 Howev-
er, determination of this factor often requires an opportunity to question the
poster as to exactly what she saw and what assumptions she is making.'97
During an emergency or crisis, it seems unlikely that a social media user
will have time to individually question the poster and discover the context in
which the post was made. One final factor for reporters to consider is
whether any corroborating sources exist, either from other social media us-
ers or from official sources such as the police or the CDC.19 8 Yet again, this
process requires a social media user to invest time that may not be available
during an emergency in order to determine the trustworthiness of the source.
For all of these factors that reporters must consider when determining
the trustworthiness of the source, it is important to recognize that reporters
are trained to vet trustworthy from untrustworthy sources. It seems a safe
assumption that the general public who relies on social media during an
emergency 1) has not received the specialized training and knowledge a re-
porter receives and 2) is not vetting sources of information on a regular
basis, or at least is not as experienced as a reporter is at doing so.
190. Steiner, supra note 26.
191. See Jeff Sonderman, How to Verif-and When to Publish-News Accounts
Posted on Social Media, POYNTER (July 08, 2011, 12:34 PM), http://www.poynter.org/
how-tos/newsgathering-storytelling/138495/how-to-verify-and-when-to-publish-news-accounts-
posted-on-social-medial.
192. See Myers, supra note 178 (discussing how journalists have been tricked by misin-
formation promulgated via social media).
193. See Sonderman, supra note 191.
194. Id.
195. Id. ("Much social media misinformation comes from sources who are mistaken, not
outright liars.").
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
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A prime example of the disconnect due to unreliability is the reliance on
and unreliability of Yahoo! Answers.19 9 In a comparative study across refer-
ence sites, Yahoo! Answers is among the most frequently consulted
reference sites, but it is also one of the most inaccurate. 20 Part of its inaccu-
racy is due to the limited ability to verify the information posted.20' The
inability to verify posts on Yahoo! Answers may be explained by the ab-
sence of a linked profile to the main Yahoo! parent site.202 As described
above, the more developed the profile, the more generally trustworthy the
source and the information. By not linking profiles to the parent site, a Ya-
hoo! Answers profile is likely less developed and less verifiable. As
evidenced by the study's determination that Yahoo! Answers has the least
accurate information, 203 profile verifiability plays a significant role in the
ability to both verify correct information and discredit information that is
false. Yahoo! Answers focuses more on quantity of answers rather than on
quality.20 In a traditional Marketplace model, where time is not constrained
and over time the best ideas will surface,2 05 this abundance of unverifiable
information would not be as problematic. But when applied to an emergency
or crisis, the disconnect of trustworthiness is amplified. Trust issues, which
arise in the context of the use of social media during emergencies and cri-
ses, 206 were either not contemplated by the Marketplace theory or would
normally be resolved through competition of ideas over time in the Market-
place. The trust issues inherent in anonymous online postings are further
compounded by an overall heightened need for trust in the context of emer-
gency management or situations involving the health of the individual
seeking advice. 207
199. See Jacob Leibenluft, A Librarian's Worst Nightmare: Yahoo! Answers, Where 120
Million Users Can Be Wrong, SLATE (Dec. 7, 2007, 4:30 PM), http://www.slate.com/
articles/technology/technology/2007/12/a_1ibrarians worst-nightmare.single.html.
200. See Pnina Fichman, A Conparative Assessment of Answer Quality on Four Ques-
tion Answering Sites, 37 J. INFO. Sci. 476, 476-77, 482 (2011) (comparing the sites Askville,
Yahoo! Answers, Wikipedia, and WikiAnswers).
201. Id. at 477.
202. Id. at 483.
203. Id. at 477, 482.
204. See Leibenluft, supra note 199.
205. See supra Part 1.A.
206. See A. Geissbuhler et al., Confluence of Disciplines in Disciplines in Health Infor-
matics: An International Perspective, 50 METHODS OF INFO. MED. 545, 548 (2011)
(discussing peer review and crowd sourced peer voting as potential solutions to the issue of
reliability of information on social media networks).
207. See Glass & Schoch-Spana, supra note 169, at 221; see also Brittany A. Hackworth
& Michelle B. Kunz, Health Care and Social Media: Building Relationships via Social Net-
works, 6 ACAD. HEALTH CARE MGMT. J. 55, 55-56 (2010) (discussing the need for trust in a
provider-patient relationship which involves the health and well-being of the patient).
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IV. A MIDDLE GROUND?: SELF-REGULATION MAY SAVE THE
MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS DURING EMERGENCIES
AND PUBLIC HEALTH CRISES
A decentralized, open access Marketplace is preferred under our First
Amendment right to freedom of speech and expression,201 but there are
clearly prohibitive disconnects between the Marketplace theory and social
media use during an emergency or crisis. 2" Given the three disconnects dis-
cussed in Part III of this Note, Marketplace theorists' proposition that the
Marketplace breaks down in such a situation may have some merit.210 How-
ever, it is also possible that the Marketplace theory can overcome these
disconnects by adapting to the unique context of emergencies by applying a
theory-similar to Balkin's-of freedom of speech as a regulative ideal
based on the idea of a democratic culture. 211 First, I will explain my theory
that when utilized for emergency situations or crises, social media consti-
tutes its own mini-marketplace (such as those articulated by Justices
Rehnquist and Brennan),212 and that in this context, social media is subject
to its own unique regulatory scheme, in which there exists self-regulation of
user-posted content. Second, I will examine select case studies, the principal
being the 2007 shooting at Virginia Tech,213 where social media was used as
a resource during a crisis. These case studies demonstrate that self-
regulation of posted content may help mitigate the extent of the disconnects
we would typically expect to see with a Marketplace model in the context of
an emergency.
A. Dispelling the Disconnects: How an Adaptive Self-Regulatory
Marketplace Can Help Mitigate the Effects
of Marketplace Disconnects
While it is clear that a traditional Marketplace model breaks down when
applied to the unique context of the use of social media during emergencies
and crises,214 the possibility of an adaptive self-regulatory Marketplace may
salvage the Marketplace theory in this context. The adaptive self-regulatory
208. Jerry Berman & Daniel J. Weitzner, Abundance and User Control: Renewing the
Democratic Heart of the First Amendment in the Age of Interactive Media, 104 YALE L.J.
1619, 1620 (1995).
209. See supra Part 111.
210. See supra Part I.C.
211. See supra Part I.D.
212. See supra Part I.E.
213. See Sarah Vieweg et al., Collective Intelligence in Disaster: Examination of the Phe-
nomenon in the Aftermath of the 2007 Virginia Tech Shooting, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 5TH
INTERNATIONAL ISCRAM CONFERENCE (2008), available at http://www.jeannettesutton.
com/uploads/CollectivelntelligencelSCRAM08.pdf; see also Leysia Palen et al., Crisis in a Net-
worked World: Features of Computer-Mediated Communication in the April 16, 2007, Virginia
Tech Event, 27 Soc. SCI. COMPUTER REv. 467 (2009).
214. See supra Part Ill.
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Marketplace theory first relies on the opinions of Justices Rehnquist and
Brennan, which imply the existence of mini-marketplaces of ideas.2 1 1 While
neither justice may have conceived of social media as a mini-marketplace, it
is consistent with their articulated theories that such a Marketplace could
exist.216 For this Note, I propose more specifically that social media used
during an emergency or crisis operates as its own mini-marketplace. As
such, social media in this context will have "its own dynamics, parameters,
regulatory scheme, and audience." 217
This Note proposes that the appropriate regulatory scheme for social
media used in this context is a self-regulatory scheme. As discussed in Part
II, social media embraces many of the elements of a traditional Marketplace,
because the Internet and social media encourage the competition of ideas,
accept the public at large as the best provider of ideas, and champion con-
tradictory points of view as valuable to the search for truth. However, as
discussed in Part III of this Note, social media, when utilized in the context
of an emergency or crisis, experiences some major disconnects from the
traditional Marketplace theory. Thus, there is a need for an appropriate regu-
latory scheme in this context.
In order to preserve as many of the elements of the traditional Market-
place theory embodied by social media as possible, this Note proposes a
self-regulatory scheme for social media used during an emergency or crisis.
The theory assumes that most individuals will self-regulate the content they
post. The assumption that users will self-regulate before they post does not
seem much more realistic than the assumption of the traditional Marketplace
theory that all participants are thinking rationally to arrive at the truth or
best answer. However, the assumption that individuals will self-regulate is
more likely to be true because this assumption will be made in the context
of the mini-marketplace in which information on a particular crisis is to be
discussed. Individuals providing and seeking information on that particular
crisis are more likely to be both interested in and knowledgeable about the
subject matter. Because the theory relies on an interested and engaged sub-
set of the public at large, it also seems more likely that those individuals will
self-regulate their own postings in order to engage in rational discussion and
debate on a topic of interest and importance to them. This Note recognizes
that self-regulation is not a perfect solution and it will not completely elimi-
nate the disconnects discussed in Part III, but it may help mitigate their
effects.
Self-regulation may help mitigate or eliminate the three disconnects that
otherwise would materialize in the Marketplace: 1) lack of time, 2) false and
215. See supra Part I.E.
216. See supra Part I.E. (according to Rehnquist and Brennan's theory, these social
media mini-marketplaces would permit unique regulatory structures, here self-regulation by
the posters).
217. See Hopkins, supra note 16, at 48.
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counterproductive information, and 3) distinguishing trustworthy from un-
trustworthy sources. In an emergency situation where time is of the essence,
social media can be very useful because content can be posted and viewed
almost instantaneously. Time becomes a troublesome issue when too much
content is posted in a short period of time, rendering it too costly to sort and
filter through in order to determine which is the best. Self-regulation of user-
posted content can help mitigate the negative effects of lack of time. If, for
example, social media users repost content they believe to be true and im-
portant during the emergency, the volume of content may actually help
dispel the disconnect of time. 218 This is because an increase in the volume of
content-pre-determined by the reposters to be of value-subsequently
increases the likelihood that social media users looking for valuable
information will more quickly and easily find the best information, due to
the frequency at which it will appear on the social media website. This as-
sumes that reposters will self-regulate their repostings by limiting content to
that which they know or strongly suspect to be true and useful to others dur-
ing the emergency. Reposting information the social media user perceives to
be false or unreliable only adds unnecessary clutter to a situation where time
to sift through the unnecessary information is not available.
Depending on the situation, this self-regulation of repostings to help
mitigate the disconnect with time could take many forms. For one, citation
to the original poster as the source of the reposted content will save time for
the person reviewing information gathered from social media that views the
repost. Depending on the gravity of the situation, perhaps it would be ap-
propriate for the second poster to only repost content that she herself is able
to verify, thus eliminating the need to vet the original source. Assuming a
self-regulatory scheme appropriate for the situation, the more frequent the
reposting by social media users, the more likely it will be that those users
looking for the information will find it in a timely fashion. The disconnect
of time in regards to emergency situations can never be eliminated, regard-
less of the degree of regulation imposed, but instant access to social media
postings that have been self-regulated, preselected, and prescreened by the
reposters may help mitigate this disconnect with the Marketplace.
Self-regulation may also help mitigate the disconnects of false or coun-
terproductive information and the vetting of the trustworthiness of sources.
218. See Katie Starbird & Leysia Palen, Pass it on?: Retweeting in Mass Emergency, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 7TH ANNUAL ISCRAM CONFERENCE 9 (2010), available at
fsb.cvm.msu.edu/documents/starbirdpaleniscramretweet.pdf. Reposting content is a process
used on social networking sites in order to share another social media user's content via post-
ing the copied information to your account so that everyone in your social network can also
view the content. Thus, the message's range is expanded because it reaches both the original
poster's social media network, as well as everyone else in the second poster's social media
network. Tweets are short posts of under 140 characters on the website Twitter and retweeting
is the process of reposting another user's tweets to share with all of the second tweeter's
friends. Id.
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If social media follows Rehnquist and Brennan's mini-marketplace, 21 9 ac-
cess to such a marketplace "is likely to be easier, the audience is likely to
have more common ground, and there is greater likelihood of some resulting
resolution." 220 While it is beyond the scope of this Note to study the posting
mentality of social media users, it seems likely that the common mentality
shared by the audience in this mini-marketplace would lead posters to rec-
ognize the gravity of the situation during a particular emergency. Therefore,
based on the seriousness of the situation, the users would seemingly be
more inclined to self-regulate their posts and refrain from intentionally
posting false or counterproductive information that did not come from
respectable authority. Self-regulation cannot eliminate the possibility of the
spread of-and reliance on-false or counterproductive information, but the
combination of self-regulation with the application of the mini-marketplace
theory has the potential to mitigate the disconnect. As explained above with
regards to the time disconnect, verification of posts or reposts perceived to
be truthful and useful will also help mitigate the possibility that misinfor-
mation will be relied on too heavily and for too long. While there isn't time
to properly vet the trustworthy from untrustworthy sources, self-regulating
social media posters who cite the source of their information or who repost
information from other posters that is perceived to be useful can also help
mitigate the extent of the disconnect. While certainly not a perfect solution
to the elimination of the disconnects between the Marketplace and social
media, self-regulation offers the potential to mitigate some of the negative
consequences of these disconnects during emergencies or crises.
B. Case Studies: Examples of Self-Regulation in the
Social Media Emergency Marketplace
Having established a theory by which the Marketplace can potentially
be salvaged from the various underlying disconnects that threaten it, this
Note will now look at some select case studies of social media's use during
an emergency or crisis. The first and primary case study this Note will ana-
lyze is the shooting at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
(Virginia Tech) on April 16, 2007.221 It should be noted at the outset that the
use of social media in this study took place after the actual shooting oc-
curred, 2 2 in Facebook groups dedicated to determining the identity of the
219. See supra Part I.E.
220. See Hopkins, supra note 16, at 48.
221. See Maria Newman & Christine Hauser, Panel on Virginia Tech Shooting Issues
Report, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/22/us/22cnd-
virginia.html (describing the events of the 2007 Virginia Tech shooting in which 32
people-not including the gunman, student Seung-Hui Cho, who committed suicide-were
shot and killed in two separate shootings: one in a dorm room around 7:00 AM and the second
in a classroom from 9:30-9:50 AM).
222. Vieweg et al., supra note 213, at 2, 4. If we define the actual emergency as con-
strained to the time between when the shootings began and when they ended, then these social
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victims of the shooting.223 Numerous Facebook groups were able to collec-
tively identify thirty-two victims, hours before the University released the
official list.224 However, no Facebook group's list contained an exhaustive
list of all of the victims. 225
Participation in these Facebook groups fits the description of the mini-
marketplaces articulated by Rehnquist and Brennan. 226 While participation
in these specific Facebook groups was open to the public, in reality, social
media users self-selected whether to participate in the groups based on their
interest level in the topic, and thus, participation was not universal. As a
result, the audience involved in the Virginia Tech postings appeared to be
genuinely interested and knowledgeable about the events of the shooting.
A mini-marketplace will have its own regulatory scheme that allows the
Marketplace theory to adapt to the unique circumstances of the crisis
without disturbing its underlying assumptions. For this particular crisis, self-
regulation is the regulatory scheme employed. Posters who contributed to
the verification of victims' identities self-regulated by refraining from post-
ing names of the victims until they had a reliable source-this helped
maintain order in the Facebook groups.227 In many instances where a poster
listed the name of an individual believed to be deceased, the poster provided
the relationship to the deceased or described the individual circumstances
which positioned the poster with access to privileged information. Examples
include writing that the deceased was an Air Force buddy or fellow sorority
sister, or noting that the poster had just finished speaking with the de-
ceased's girlfriend. 2 8 When individuals did not post their source or position
to obtain the privileged information, the poster would often be asked by oth-
ers on the message board to provide sources for this knowledge. 2 9 There are
also documented instances where a poster placed a question mark by the
name of a suspected deceased, indicating that there was no confirmation that
media postings technically did not take place in the context of an emergency. It is also possi-
ble that these results were unique because of the short duration of the emergency and the
relatively localized places, points in time, and people involved in the emergency situation. The
use of social media during a large-scale natural disaster or act of terrorism might not have the
coherence and efficacy experienced during the Virginia Tech incident.
223. Id. at 2.
224. Id. at 2, 4. Virginia Tech confirmed that thirty-two were dead at 2:13 PM on the
16th, but they did not release any names at that time. Documented Facebook postings in Face-
book groups dedicated to determining who was confirmed dead began around 9:30 PM on the
16th and continued until the University released the names of the deceased on the 17th at 9:17
PM.
225. Id.
226. See supra Part I.E.
227. See Vieweg et al., supra note 213, at 3 ("Participants in the list-building activities
self-policed, and they knew that adding a name to the list was a serious statement. Accuracy,
verification, and gravitas ruled the interaction on these focal point sites.").
228. Id. at 5.
229. Id.
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this individual was among the casualties. 23 0 Additionally, there are docu-
mented instances of a poster deleting the name of a suspected victim when
that victim's death could not be confirmed.2 3 ' A number of posters also
compiled and updated lists of names that were confirmed or strongly be-
lieved to be true.232 This list-building and compilation of posts enabled new
participants in the discussion to be updated quickly without having to spend
a significant amount of time re-reading older posts.
These displays of self-regulation may explain why many of the discon-
nects between traditional Marketplace theory and its application to social
media use during an emergency or crisis did not manifest in this situation.
Regarding the time constraint, the list of names compiled on the Facebook
groups was more timely and more accurate than the information being re-
ported by traditional news media sources.233 In addition, the compilation of
posts and list-building provided a very efficient and reliable method to up-
date information seekers on the current state of the crisis. Even still, the
inability of a single Facebook group to develop an exhaustive list of the
names of all thirty-two victims is evidence of the Marketplace's inability to
completely self-correct in a short period of time.
However, the second disconnect concerning the promulgation of false or
misleading information did not manifest here. In one recorded instance
when a victim could not be verified at the time, the post was quickly deleted
and the victim was not added to the running list of names.234 As posited in
Part IV.A of this Note, it seems likely that the social media posters recog-
nized the gravity of the situation and quickly corrected any known errors in
order to limit the spread of misinformation. Likewise, the problems related
to the vetting of sources did not manifest, because the individuals posting
the names of the victims would almost always cite the source from which
they discovered the identity of the victim.235 Here, too, it seems likely that
the posters recognized the gravity of the situation and the need to have some
reliable authority before posting the victim's name. Posters' self-regulation
combined with citation to reliable sources greatly advanced the ability of
social media users to quickly and effectively vet the trustworthiness of the
posts. The result of such self-regulation is that social media has demonstrat-
ed its ability to outpace traditional news media sources both in accuracy and
timeliness during an emergency using a Marketplace model, even given the
expected disconnects. By recognizing the discussion of the crisis as a mini-
marketplace subject to its own self-regulatory scheme, and given the
self-selection of the audience to those genuinely interested participants, the
230. Id. at 8.
231. Id. at 7.
232. Id. at 8.
233. Id. at 9.
234. Id. at 7.
235. Id. at 6-7.
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Marketplace theory is able to slightly adapt and flourish in the context of
social media.
The second case study this Note will examine involves the use of Twit-
ter during concurring natural disasters in the spring of 2009-the Red River
that flooded the Red River Valley and the grassfires that swept across the
Oklahoma plains. 23 6 This case study looked particularly at a number of re-
tweets or repostings in connection with either of these two disasters.237 The
study found that during the time period of the emergency, retweets from
locals were more likely to be about the emergency than original tweets.238
Thus, the authors of the study concluded that the examination of retweets
during emergencies is an effective way to gauge what information and opin-
ions individuals at the site of the emergency deem to be most important,
useful, and recommended. 23 9
This observation regarding retweets supports this Note's hypothesis that
self-regulation of postings has the potential to mitigate the typical discon-
nects we would expect to see in the Marketplace. By retweeting information
deemed important and useful, Twitter users during these two concurrent
emergencies demonstrated the ability to self-regulate their postings. In do-
ing so, the posters helped mitigate the disconnect of time by pointing users
looking for information to the tweets deemed most useful-those that had
been retweeted the most. Likewise, retweeting helped mitigate the third dis-
connect of vetting sources by attributing authorship of the original tweet to
the original source in the retweet. 240 The study of twitter messages relating
to the Red River flooding and Oklahoma Plains grassfires is another exam-
ple demonstrating the possibility that self-regulation of user posting can be
used to mitigate the disconnects one would expect to find in the Market-
place.
CONCLUSION
The Marketplace of Ideas theory, based on unregulated freedom of
speech that encourages as many diverse viewpoints as possible, may be
most purely manifested through social media. Social media has significantly
lowered the barriers to entry into the Marketplace. However, it is clear that
the underlying assumptions of the Marketplace theory are exposed when
applied to emergency situations, and the Marketplace is in danger of col-
lapsing under these circumstances. The possibility of regulation, as opposed
to suppression, allows the Marketplace theory to survive and adapt to the
236. See Starbird & Paylen, supra note 218, at 3.
237. See Starbird & Paylen, supra note 218 and accompanying text.
238. Id. at 5.
239. Id. at 9.
240. Id. at 5 ("Our research suggests that retweets act as an informal recommendation
system for both the information and the original author.").
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unique environment of an emergency. As exemplified best by the Virginia
Tech case study, the Marketplace theory may effectively apply to the use of
social media during an emergency or public health crisis. However, it is
equally likely that this application of the Marketplace theory was only pos-
sible due to the regulatory measures that social media users self-imposed.
There is no guarantee that the disconnects between the Marketplace and
social media used during an emergency or crisis can be completely resolved,
but an adaptive, self-regulating Marketplace has proven that it can survive.
